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CENTRALIZED AND DECENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT OF
LOCAL COMMON POOL RESOURCES IN THE
DEVELOPING WORLD: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE
FROM FISHING COMMUNITIES IN COLOMBIA
MARIA ALEJANDRA VELEZ, JAMES J. MURPHY, and JOHN K. STRANLUND*

This article uses experimental data to test for a complementary relationship
between formal regulations imposed on a community to conserve a local natural
resource and nonbinding verbal agreements to do the same. Our experiments were
conducted in the field in three regions of Colombia. Our results suggest that the
hypothesis of a complementary relationship between communication and external
regulation is supported for some combinations of regions and regulations but
cannot be supported in general. We conclude that the determination of whether
formal regulations and informal communication are complementary must be made
on a community-by-community basis. (JEL C93, H41, Q20, Q28)

I.

INTRODUCTION

In this article, we report the results of a
series of common pool resource experiments
conducted in three regions of Colombia that
depend on small-scale fishing. Our field experiments were designed to investigate whether
regulations imposed on a community to conserve a local natural resource complement
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munity to do the same in the sense that a combination of formal regulations and informal
community agreements leads to greater conservation of a shared local resource than community efforts alone.
A large literature of experimental research
from different disciplines has demonstrated
the positive welfare effects of simply allowing
subjects to communicate with each other in
common pool resource settings.1 Communication can be effective because it allows participants to (1) share information about the
nature of the game, its incentives, and decisions
that maximize group payoffs; (2) coordinate
their actions and send signals about intentions;
(3) express displeasure about undesirable or
unacceptable outcomes; (4) reduce social distance among group members; and (5) punish
uncooperative behavior, for example, by agreeing not to cooperate in future periods if total
group harvest exceeds some threshold.
A smaller literature has looked at the effects
of external regulations—fixed quotas with
1. For recent reviews of the effects of communication
in social dilemma experiments, see Shankar and Pavitt
(2002) and Cardenas, Ahn, and Ostrom (2004).

ABBREVIATIONS
INCODER: Instituto Colombiano de
Desarrollo Rural
WWF: World Wildlife Fund
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some exogenous enforcement apparatus—on
behavior in experimental common property
games. This literature suggests that regulatory
controls on the use of common pool resources
may not be as effective as one would hope.
Ostmann (1998) finds that external regulation
and enforcement financed by experiment participants only reduce harvests by a small
amount relative to a regulation-free environment. Beckenkamp and Ostmann (1999)
report that middle levels of sanction lead to
a reduction in the exploitation of a common
property resource, but higher sanctions can
cause overuse because subjects may perceive
the high sanction to be unfair. Cardenas,
Stranlund, and Willis (2000) found that
a quota supported by weak enforcement is
effective in initial rounds, but as subjects realize the weak consequences of noncompliance,
the effectiveness of the regulation quickly
erodes. Ostrom (2000) discusses how enforcement of externally imposed rules may crowd
out endogenous cooperative behavior, because it may discourage the formation of
social norms to solve the dilemma, and at
the same time may encourage players to cheat
the system.
However, little research has been done to
investigate the effects of allowing subjects to
communicate under an external regulation
in common pool resource experiments. We
are motivated to pursue this line of inquiry
because of our interest in the relationship
between informal community efforts to conserve common property resources in the developing world and formal regulatory controls to
do the same. Villagers in communities like
those we visited typically interact and cooperate with each other on a variety of community
issues. Thus, when examining the effects of
external regulation on local natural resource
use, it is unreasonable to expect that regulations would simply replace nonbinding agreements among community members. Even
under government regulations, community
members are likely to interact with each other
and develop informal norms of behavior. The
question that this article addresses is whether
these informal norms and formal regulations
are complementary institutions for conserving
local common pool resources.
Whether communication and regulations
are complementary has important implications for judging the effectiveness of government interventions in local common pool

resource problems. Evaluating the performance of an intervention must be done in
comparison to the performance of existing
community conservation efforts and with
the recognition that community members will
likely continue to pursue informal norms of
behavior when the regulation is in place.
Moreover, since regulatory interventions are
costly, they are only justified in locales where
the regulations will complement existing community efforts.2
The same processes that make communication effective in the absence of regulatory controls may also serve to complement, and
be complemented by, formal regulations.
For example, communication can serve as a
mechanism to socialize information about
the efficiency-enhancing goals of a regulation
and the formal consequences of noncompliance with the regulation. Similarly, a regulation
can complement cooperative community efforts if it provides a signal of efficient individual
behavior that can serve as a focal point for
community interactions. Moreover, group communication and the enforcement of a formal
regulation can provide complementary consequences for overexploiting the resource. That
is, communication can support a weak enforcement apparatus by bringing social pressure to
bear on individuals to achieve more efficient
outcomes, and regulatory enforcement provides an explicit sanction for noncompliance
that may be necessary to support informal verbal agreements.3
On the other hand, we recognize that certain kinds of group interactions could lead
2. Bischoff (2007) is the only other study of which we
are aware that combines communication and regulation in
common pool experiments. Bischoff’s study differs from
ours in several ways, but the most important difference
is that he did not examine whether communication and
regulations performed better than communication alone.
In fact, he finds that external regulation with communication induced a greater level of cooperation than external
regulation alone. Although this result is potentially important in some settings, it does not provide the comparison
between communication under a regulation and communication alone that we feel is the most relevant comparison
for evaluating the performance of regulatory interventions
in local common pool resource problems.
3. Baland and Platteau (1996) provide a conceptual
discussion of potential complementarities between formal
and informal institutions for managing common pool
resources in developing countries. They suggest that such
complementarities between government and user groups
or communities can be exploited in comanagement
arrangements. Also see Bowles and Gintis (2002) and
Bowles (2003).

to worse outcomes. It is possible that community members may implicitly transfer responsibility for resource management to the external
authority. For example, group discussions may
lead to a consensus that group members are in
a game against the government, thereby shifting the focus away from the benefits of voluntarily coordinating actions. More specifically,
communication could lead to a focus on the
weak consequences of noncompliance with
a regulation instead of reinforcing its welfareenhancing objective.
We test for complementarities between formal regulations and informal nonbinding communication with a series of common pool
resource experiments conducted in three geographically distinct fishing areas of Colombia.
Although villagers in each of these areas
depend heavily on the local fishery, these areas
are different along several dimensions (which
we discuss briefly in Section II). Rather than
using a neutral frame, our experiments were
explicitly concerned with extraction decisions
from a common pool fishery.4 Thus, our experimental design avoids the problem that individuals in different communities may approach
a ‘‘neutral’’ or ‘‘decontextualized’’ experiment
in different ways.5 Each group of five subjects
first played ten rounds of a baseline limitedaccess common pool resource game (without
communication or regulation) and then ten
additional rounds under one of five institutions: face-to-face communication alone, one
of two external regulations alone, and communication combined with each of the two regulations. The two external regulations consist
of an individual harvest quota that was set at
the level that maximizes a group’s payoff but
differ with respect to the level of enforcement.
In both cases, the level of enforcement was chosen to be rather weak because this is typical of
regulatory control of natural resources in the
4. Within their recent taxonomy of field experiments,
Harrison and List (2004) would classify our experiments
as framed field experiments because they were conducted
with a population of subjects for which the phenomenon
of interest (behavior in a common pool fishery) is also an
important element of the subjects’ experiences.
5. See the Henrich et al. (2005) experiments across 15
small societies and the comments by Vernon Smith,
Randolph Grace, and Simon Kemp (among others) in
the same volume. The commentators questioned the neutral frame of these experiments because it could have been
understood in different ways across the societies. Hence,
the reported behavioral differences across societies could
have been the result of different interpretations of the game
instead of particular behavioral patterns in each society.

developing world. We conducted the full set
of experiments in each area to determine
whether the results we obtained in one region
were replicable in the others.
We find no statistically significant differences in individual harvest decisions across the
regions in the first-stage limited-access game
but significant regional variation in responses
to the second-stage institutions. This suggests
that the differences in responses to the secondstage institutions we observe cannot be due to
regional variation in how subjects responded
to the fundamental common property problem; rather, these differences must be due
solely to variation in responses to the alternative institutions.
In all cases, the second-stage institutions
were effective in reducing harvests from the
limited-access baseline. Thus, if we were to
judge the performance of each of the regulations with respect to the limited-access baseline, we would conclude that they were
effective in each region although not equally
so. Again, however, the appropriate comparison is between regulation combined with
communication and communication alone,
and a regulation can only be justified if it
complements nonbinding communication. Our
results suggest that the hypothesis of a complementary relationship between communication
and external regulation is supported for some
combinations of regions and regulations but
cannot be supported in general. We find that
external regulation complements group communication in three of the six possible cases. In two
cases, regulation and communication together
led to harvest decisions that were no different
from those under communication alone. In
the remaining case, regulation combined with
communication actually led to greater harvests
than communication alone, suggesting that the
regulation crowded out cooperative efforts to
conserve the resource.

II. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

Our experiments are based on the standard
problem of individual harvests from a common pool resource by n identical individuals.
We use a static model similar to that presented
by Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker (1994),
Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher (2002), and
an earlier model developed by Cornes and
Sandler (1983). Individual i harvests yi units

up to a capacity constraint ymax
. Units of hari
vest sell at a constant price p. The individual’s
harvest costsPare cðyi þ yi Þ þ dyi ðyi þ yi Þ,
where yi 5
j6¼i yj and c and d are positive
constants. The individual has an endowment
ei. Thus, individual payoffs are
ð1Þ

pi 5 ei þ pyi  cðyi þ yi Þ
 dyi ðyi þ yi Þ;
subject to 0  yi  ymax
:
i

Maximizing pi with respect to yi yields i’s
Nash best-response function:
ð2Þ

yi ðyi Þ 5 min½ðp  c  dyi Þ=2d; ymax
;
i

provided that p  c  dyi . 0 for all feasible
yi.
It is well known that pure Nash strategies
result in inefficiently high harvest levels. A
government authority that imposes and enforces an individual harvest quota could address
this inefficiency. In this framework, inducing
compliance is largely a matter of finding the
correct expected penalty to reduce harvest
levels to the efficient quota. However, this approach ignores other factors that may also
explain individual compliance decisions. Of
particular importance to us is how communication may work to support individual compliance with a formal regulation. Moreover,
individuals may respond to the frame that a
regulation provides, that is, that the quota
provides a signal of efficient harvests, and
the expected penalty signals that deviations
from the quota may be punished.
Subjects were placed in groups of five and
participated in a 20-period common pool
resource game that was framed as a harvest
decision from a shared fishery.6 Each subject
received an identical payoff table that was generated from a simple modification of Equation
(1). The concept of zero harvest is very difficult
to explain in the field because the participants
depend so critically on their use of local natural resources. Therefore, individual harvest
choices were shifted by 1 to range from 1 to
9. Accordingly, we modified Equation (1) by
defining ^yi 5 yi  1 and created the individual
payoff table from pi 5 ei þ p^yi  cð^yi þ ^yi Þ 
d^yi ð^yi þ ^yi Þ, with parameters p 5 116.875, c 5
6. Assignment to groups was not completely random.
We tried to ensure that relatives were in separate groups.

17.875, d 5 2.75, and ei 5 900.7 The resulting
payoff table used in the experiments is shown
in Table 1. With these values, the standard
symmetric Nash equilibrium is achieved when
each individual chooses yi 5 7, while the group
payoff-maximizing individual harvest is 2
units. In addition to deciding upon a level
of extraction, yi, in each round, subjects were
also asked to state their expectation of the
total extraction
P by the other four group members, yei 5 j6¼i yej 2 ½4; 36.8
Each group played a first stage with ten
rounds of a typical common pool resource
game without communication or external regulation (Limited Access); the second stage
consisted of ten additional rounds under
one of the following institutions:
face-to-face communication (Communication);
external regulation with a low penalty (Low
Penalty);
external regulation with a medium penalty
(Medium Penalty);
face-to-face communication with a low
penalty and external regulation (Low Penalty/
Communication);
face-to-face communication with a medium
penalty and external regulation (Medium
Penalty/Communication).
Each of the five treatments was repeated 12
times, with four groups in each of the three
regions. In the three treatments that allowed
communication, participants were free to discuss anything related to the experiment prior
to making their harvest decisions privately in
each round. For the four treatments that
involved an external regulation, an individual
harvest quota of 2 units (the efficient individual harvest) was imposed. To enforce the
quota, each subject faced an audit probability
of 10%.9 If an inspection revealed that a
7. Experiment instructions are available upon request.
8. In a public goods experiment, Croson (2007) also
asked subjects about their expectations about the choices
of the other group members. However, she compensated
them for more accurate predictions. In our experiments,
subjects’ earnings were based solely on their choices
and not affected by their predictions of others’ choices.
Other studies that use the expectations about other group
members’ behavior include Bornstein and Ben-Yossef
(1994), Komorita, Parks, and Hulbert (1992), and
Yamagishi and Sato (1986).
9. To decide who in a group, if anyone, was inspected
in a particular round, a ballot was chosen from a bag containing five ballots with the participants’ numbers on them
and five other blank ballots.

TABLE 1
Earnings Table
My Level of Extraction
Level of Extraction
of Others
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Average of the
Others

900
882
864
846
829
811
793
775
757
739
721
703
686
668
650
632
614
596
578
560
543
525
507
489
471
453
435
417
400
382
364
346
328

996
976
955
934
914
893
873
852
831
811
790
769
749
728
708
687
666
646
625
604
584
563
543
522
501
481
460
439
419
398
378
357
336

1,087
1,064
1,040
1,017
994
970
947
923
900
877
853
830
807
783
760
736
713
690
666
643
620
596
573
549
526
503
479
456
433
409
386
362
339

1,172
1,146
1,120
1,094
1,068
1,042
1,016
989
963
937
911
885
859
833
807
780
754
728
702
676
650
624
598
571
545
519
493
467
441
415
389
362
336

1,252
1,223
1,194
1,165
1,137
1,108
1,079
1,050
1,021
992
963
934
906
877
848
819
790
761
732
703
675
646
617
588
559
530
501
472
444
415
386
357
328

1,326
1,295
1,263
1,231
1,200
1,168
1,137
1,105
1,073
1,042
1,010
978
947
915
884
852
820
789
757
725
694
662
631
599
567
536
504
472
441
409
378
346
314

1,395
1,361
1,326
1,292
1,258
1,223
1,189
1,154
1,120
1,086
1,051
1,017
983
948
914
879
845
811
776
742
708
673
639
604
570
536
501
467
433
398
364
329
295

1,458
1,421
1,384
1,347
1,310
1,273
1,236
1,198
1,161
1,124
1,087
1,050
1,013
976
939
901
864
827
790
753
716
679
642
604
567
530
493
456
419
382
345
307
270

1,516
1,476
1,436
1,396
1,357
1,317
1,277
1,237
1,197
1,157
1,117
1,077
1,038
998
958
918
878
838
798
758
719
679
639
599
559
519
479
439
400
360
320
280
240

1.0
1.3
1.5
1.8
2.0
2.3
2.5
2.8
3.0
3.3
3.5
3.8
4.0
4.3
4.5
4.8
5.0
5.3
5.5
5.8
6.0
6.3
6.5
6.8
7.0
7.3
7.5
7.8
8.0
8.3
8.5
8.8
9.0

subject’s harvest exceeded 2, then that person
incurred a financial penalty; the results of
inspections were not made public. We examine
two regulations that differ only in the level of
the unit penalty for discovered harvests that
exceeded the quota. For the Low Penalty
and Low Penalty/Communication treatments,
the penalty was 27 pesos per unit above the
quota. We chose this penalty because the
resulting expected marginal penalty is not high
enough to change the pure Nash strategy
equilibrium from the baseline Limited Access
equilibrium of 7 units for each individual.

Nevertheless, such a regulation might serve
to reduce individual harvests because of the
frame the regulation places on the experiment,
in particular the signal of efficient choices and
that deviations from the quota will be sanctioned. For the Medium Penalty and Medium
Penalty/Communication treatments, the unit
penalty was 165 pesos. The Nash strategy
equilibrium with this penalty is 6 units for each
individual. We chose enforcement strategies
that were rather weak, at least under a conventional theory of regulatory enforcement,
because this is likely to be a characteristic of

TABLE 2
Summary Statistics of Subject Characteristicsa
Subject Characteristics
Mean age (yr)
Mean years of formal education
Percent male
Percent who have lived in the same community
for 10 yr or more
Percent for whom fishing is their main activity
a

N

Caribbean

N

Magdalena

N

Pacific

100
97
100
100

35.6
6.3
55%
78%

100
100
100
100

42.4
4.7
83%
93%

98
93
100
98

42.3
4.7
89%
95%

90

69%

98

87%

98

94%

N refers to the number of responses. There were 100 participants in each of the three regions.

most regulatory controls of resource use in the
developing world.
In each round, subjects were asked to choose
a harvest level. After all subjects made these
decisions, the monitor collected this information and announced to the group the aggregate
level of harvest for that round. With this information, individuals were able to calculate their
individual payoffs from the level of total harvest by the others. Individual earnings ranged
between 11,220 and 22,900 pesos, with an
average of 15,240 pesos (about US$6.00 in
2004).10 Earnings were paid in cash at the
end of each experiment. Each experiment lasted
about 3 h. Before each experiment began,
instructions were read aloud by the monitor
and several practice rounds that did not count
toward final earnings were played to familiarize
the participants with the experiments.
The experiments were conducted during the
summer of 2004 in three distinct areas of
Colombia: on the Caribbean Coast, along the
Magdalena River, and on the Pacific Coast.
A total of 300 individuals participated in the
experiments, evenly divided among the three
regions. Summary statistics of the subjects’
characteristics by region are provided in
Table 2. The Magdalena and the Pacific
regions were roughly comparable across all
five dimensions: the mean age was about 42
yr with almost 5 yr of formal education. Subjects in these two regions were overwhelmingly
male fishermen who had lived in the same
community for more than 10 yr. In the Caribbean, subjects were younger and more educated. There was also a more even gender
distribution (55% male). Relative to the other
two communities, a smaller majority of sub10. Daily wages in the regions where the experiments
were conducted varied between 10,000 and 15,000 pesos.

jects lived in the same community for over
10 yr and earned their living primarily from
fishing.
An important element of our design is that
all treatments were conducted in each of the
three regions. Our motivation for doing so
was to examine whether the results we obtained
in one region were replicated in the others or
whether there are significant regional differences in outcomes. The three communities were
chosen because they vary with respect to how
formal fishing regulations and more informal
community conservation efforts play a role
in managing local harvests. We do not develop
formal hypotheses about how community characteristics might affect behavior in our experiments, mainly because it is not possible to
conduct rigorous tests of any such hypotheses
with only three communities. In the next section, however, we do speculate about how
the relative importance of formal regulations
and informal norms in the three regions may
be correlated with our experiment outcomes.
Thus, a brief description of how the regions
are different in this regard is appropriate.
Participants in the Pacific region, more specifically the Ensenada de Tumaco, are members
of Afro-Colombian communities, the majority
of whom live in collectively owned territories.
In the Ensenada de Tumaco, 94% of the participants report that fishing, particularly shrimp
harvesting, is their main livelihood. Compared
to the other two regions, the government
authority that is charged with regulating fisheries and other natural resources has a stronger
presence in this region. Colombian fisheries
are regulated by Instituto Colombiano de
Desarrollo Rural (INCODER), a federal-level
agency under the Ministry of Agricultural
Affairs. INCODER enforces several regulations on the Pacific Coast, such as seasonal

restrictions and the prohibition of certain methods of harvesting shrimp. In general, local fishermen in the Ensenada de Tumaco are aware of
the regulations they operate under, and there
is agreement among them about the need to
regulate the shrimp fishery. Community-based
organizations, as well as international conservation nongovernmental organizations, are also
actively promoting the conservation of the natural resources of the region, in particular the
mangrove forests. International conservation
organizations are active here because they see
this region as a threatened ‘‘hot spot’’ of biodiversity. Although it is impossible to say whether
government regulations or community conservation efforts are more important in this region,
itistruethatformalregulationsaremoreimportant in the Pacific than the other two regions.
The participants in the town of La Dorada,
Caldas, and surrounding villages are part of
a mostly white and mestizo population who
harvest several species of fish from the Magdalena River and the adjacent lake, Charca de
Guarinocito, in the interior of the country.
Eighty-seven percent of the participants
reported that small-scale fishing was their
main economic activity. The presence of
INCODER in this area is considered to be
very weak—participants describe regulatory
authorities as distant, with no involvement
at all with the community. Nevertheless, most
of the participants are aware of seasonal
restrictions on harvesting certain species.
International conservation organizations are
not present in this area, but a local fishermen’s
association has been formed to manage the
local fishery. In fact, about 20% of the Magdalena participants belong to this association,
which has been actively designing and enforcing their own rules for fishing in the Charca de
Guarinocito. Thus, compared to the other two
regions, community conservation efforts are
relatively more important in the management
of the local fishery in Magdalena area than
government regulations.
Participants in the Caribbean region, more
specifically near the city of Santa Marta, are
part of a multiethnic population of whites,
mestizos, African descendants, and indigenous peoples. The proportion of participants
in this region who reported that fishing is their
main economic activity is significantly lower
than in the other two regions (69%). Some
of the other participants are small-scale fish
buyers who then resell their product in Santa

Marta. The rest are farmworkers. Generally,
the participants did not know who had the
authority to regulate the local fisheries.
Although some methods of fishing are recognized as illegal, few other fishing rules, formal
or informal, are observed in this region.
III.

RESULTS

To test for possible complementarities
between formal regulations imposed on a community to conserve a local natural resource
and nonbinding verbal agreements to do the
same, we estimate a random-effects Tobit
model in which the individual’s choice of
extraction (or harvest choice), yit, is constrained to lie between 1 and 9, inclusive:
ð3Þ

yit 5 b0 þ b1 yeit þ b2 Agei
*

þ b3 Educationi þ b4 Periodt
*

 Treatmentit þ b5 Regioni
*

 Treatmentit þ b6 Groupi
þ vi þ eit ;
where subject i 5 1, . . ., 300, period t 5 1, . . .,
20, the individual random effects are
vi ;N ð0; r2v Þ, and eit ;N ð0; r2e Þ is the idiosyncratic error term.
The constant (b0) captures individual harvests in the Limited Access, first-stage of the
experiments. Using a similar model to Equation (3), but with Limited Access harvests
interacted with regional dummies and period,
we found no significant regional or temporal
variation. This led us to eliminate these interactions in Equation (3), with the advantage of
simplifying the interpretation of the constant.
More importantly, it is particularly interesting
that the Limited Access results are replicated
in the three regions; yet, as we will see shortly,
significant regional differences emerge when
we introduce the new institutions in Stage 2.
This suggests that any differences in secondstage results are attributable to regional interactions with the different institutions and not
to regional differences in the way in which the
subject pools responded to the fundamental
common pool resource dilemma.11
11. Average harvests under Limited Access were
always below the Nash equilibrium harvests of 7 units
for each individual. Mean individual harvests for the
ten periods of this stage of the experiments were 5.7 units.
Average harvests were below Nash equilibrium predictions for each of the second-stage institutions as well.

To allow for the possibility that harvest
choices might change over time and that this
might vary across institutions, we interacted
each second-stage treatment
with period.
*
The coefficient vector b4 reflects this interaction of the five Stage 2 treatment dummy variables with period. The results from estimating
Equation (3) indicate that the time interactions with the Low Penalty and Medium Penalty treatments were jointly significant (p 5
.00) but the remaining interaction terms were
not (p 5 .48).12 For conciseness and ease of
exposition, we eliminated the nonsignificant
period interactions from the final model
reported in Table 3. Note that the two period
interactions are positive and of similar size for
the Low Penalty and Medium Penalty treatments (0.06 and 0.11); these coefficients are
statistically indistinguishable (p 5 .40). That
these coefficients are positive indicates that
harvest choices increased over time under
a weakly enforced external regulation when
the subjects are not allowed to communicate
with each other. This is consistent with the
findings of Cardenas, Stranlund, and Willis
(2000) in similar field experiments.
We included several individual characteristics as independent variables. The variable
Expectation of Their Extraction (yeit ) is what
individual i indicated that she anticipated
would be the total extraction of the other four
group members in period t. The positive and
significant coefficient (b1 5 0.12) indicates that
individuals’ harvest choices tended to increase
with their expectation of what others’ harvest
choices would be. This is inconsistent with
individuals pursuing pure Nash strategies,
but it is consistent with a strategy of conditional cooperation that others have found in
social dilemma experiments (e.g., Fischbacher,
Gachter, and Fehr 2001; Kurzban and Houser
2005). Note also that older participants tended
to choose more conservative harvests but that
more educated participants tended to choose
higher harvests.
The model in Equation (3)*includes fixed
effects (the coefficient vector b6 ) for all (but
one) of the 60 groups in our sample. For conciseness, these estimates are not reported in
Table 3. We also estimated this model without
these group effects; this had minimal impact

12. We use Wald v2 test for all hypothesis tests and
report the p values.

TABLE 3
Random-Effects Tobit Estimation of
Individual Harvestsa
Variable
Constant
Expectation of Their
Extraction (yeit )
Age (yr)
Education (years of formal
schooling)
Period  Low Penalty
Period  Medium Penalty
Caribbean region (Car)
Car  Communication
Car  Low Penalty
Car  Low Penalty/
Communication
Car  Medium Penalty
Car  Medium Penalty/
Communication
Magdalena region (Mag)
Mag  Communication
Mag  Low Penalty
Mag  Low Penalty/
Communication
Mag  Medium Penalty
Mag  Medium Penalty/
Communication
Pacific region (Pac)
Pac  Communication
Pac  Low Penalty
Pac  Low Penalty/
Communication
Pac  Medium Penalty
Pac  Medium Penalty/
Communication
N
p . v2

Coefficient
4.19*** (0.72)
0.12*** (0.01)
0.01** (0.01)
0.07** (0.03)
0.06* (0.04)
0.11*** (0.04)
0.63** (0.26)
1.28** (0.62)
2.51*** (0.27)
2.84*** (0.62)
0.67** (0.26)

1.57*** (0.26)
2.04*** (0.62)
0.93*** (0.25)
2.70*** (0.62)
1.53*** (0.26)

0.55** (0.26)
3.17*** (0.63)
1.84*** (0.27)
2.96*** (0.62)
1.81*** (0.27)
5,780
.00

a
The dependent variable is the individual’s harvest (1–
9, inclusive). The omitted treatment dummy variable is
Limited Access. Fixed-effects estimates for each group
are included but not reported. They are available upon
request. Standard errors in parentheses.
*** denotes p  .01; ** denotes p  .05; * denotes
p  .10.

on our coefficient estimates and no impact
on any of our hypotheses tests or conclusions.
The last 15 *
variables in Table 3 (the coefficient vector b5 ) reflect the interaction of
dummy variables for the three regions with
the five Stage 2 treatments. Since the omitted
dummy variable, captured by the constant, is
the Limited Access treatment, the coefficients
for these variables indicate the changes in individual harvests from Limited Access harvests

for each second-stage institution in each
region. Note that all these coefficients are negative and statistically significant. Thus, each
second-stage institution was effective at promoting more conservative harvests than under
Limited Access. Note also that there is much
variation in the size of these coefficients across
institutions and across regions. This variation
produces the main results of our work.
As expected, the Communication treatment
was effective in reducing harvests relative to
Limited Access in all three regions, although
the effect in the Magdalena (1.57) was greater
than those in the Pacific (0.55, p 5 .00) and
the Caribbean (0.63, p 5 .01) regions. The
Pacific and the Caribbean regions are not statistically different from each other (p 5 .82).
This regional variation reveals differences in
the ability of different groups to form and
maintain nonbinding verbal agreements to conserve the resource.
Some care must be taken when interpreting
the coefficients for the Low Penalty and
Medium Penalty treatments. Since we have
interacted these treatments with period and
found that harvests increased over time, the
coefficients for these treatments indicate the
reduction in harvests from Limited Access
only at the start of the second-stage treatment.
However, since we are mainly interested in the
regional variation in these treatments, our
qualitative conclusions about this variation
can be drawn from comparing the coefficients
for Low Penalty and Medium Penalty for each
region. Note the significant regional variation
in the effects of the Low Penalty. In the Caribbean, the initial reduction in individual harvests (1.28) was smaller than those in the
Pacific (3.17) and on the Magdalena River
(2.04). These regional differences are jointly
significant (p 5 .00). On the other hand, note
that the initial effects of the Medium Penalty
are about the same level in each of the regions.
Not surprisingly, there is no statistically significant difference in the effects of the Medium
Penalty among the regions (p 5 .76). Somewhat surprisingly, the higher expected penalty
under the Medium Penalty regulation did not
always produce greater harvest reductions
than the Low Penalty regulations. In the
Caribbean, the Low Penalty yielded a smaller
reduction in harvests than the higher monetary costs associated with the Medium Penalty
(1.28 vs. 2.84, p 5 .07), but in the other two
regions, there was no difference in the effects

of the two regulations (in the Pacific: 3.17
vs. 2.96, p 5 .81; in the Magdalena: 2.04
vs. 2.70, p 5 .45).
Why is there so much regional variation
with the Low Penalty but none with the
Medium Penalty? Both treatments frame the
experiments by providing a signal of the efficient individual harvest and by punishing
deviations from this choice, but the Medium
Penalty regulation has a unit fine (actual
and expected) for exceeding the harvest quota
that is over six times that of the Low Penalty
regulation. Moreover, the fine for noncompliance in the Low Penalty regulation is so low
that, at least in theory, it should have no effect
on harvest choices; yet in all regions, there was
a statistically significant reduction in harvests
with this regulation. Its effectiveness, therefore, must be largely due to the regulatory
frame, not the expected marginal penalty.
The regional variation in the effects of the
Low Penalty suggests that reliance on a simple
regulatory frame does not produce consistent
outcomes. While the Medium Penalty regulation also provides signals of efficient harvests
and sanctions for deviating from the regulatory quota, the stronger monetary incentive
of this institution produced consistent reductions in harvests across the regions, while
the weaker monetary incentive of the Low
Penalty did not. Overall, then, our results
suggest that institutions that rely on framing
effects (Low Penalty) or social pressure
(Communication) to reduce harvests will not
produce consistent outcomes, while those
that rely on a significant monetary incentive
(Medium Penalty) will.
Now, let us turn to our main hypothesis
that communication and regulation are complementary institutions. The villagers who
were the subjects in our experiments cooperate
with each other on a large number of community issues. Thus, it is likely that a regulation to
control individual harvests from a local fishery
would be implemented in communities that
already communicate with each other about
the fishery, as well as other shared concerns.
To judge the performance of a regulatory
intervention in such a community, it is appropriate for us to ask whether introducing a
regulation complements existing community
efforts but not vice versa. Let us say that communication and a regulation are complements
if their combination produces more conservative harvests than communication alone.

Of the six combinations of regions and regulations, there are three such cases. Note from
Table 3 that in the Caribbean region, the
reduction of harvests in the Low Penalty/
Communication treatment from Limited
Access (–2.51) is greater than the reduction
achieved by the Communication treatment
(0.63, p 5 .00). Thus, the Communication
and Low Penalty regulations are complementary in the Caribbean.13 The other two instances are in the Pacific region where the harvest
reduction for both the Low Penalty/Communication (1.84) and the Medium Penalty/
Communication (1.81) treatments is greater
than for Communication alone (0.55; p 5 .00
for both comparisons).
We also observe one case in which communication combined with a regulation actually
led to worse outcomes than communication
alone. When this occurs, the regulation
crowds out cooperative efforts to conserve
the resource. In the Magdalena region, the
Low Penalty/Communication treatment produced a lower reduction in individual harvests
than Communication (0.93 vs. 1.57, p 5
.07). Finally, there are two instances in which
the combined treatment had no effect relative
to Communication. This occurred with the
Medium Penalty/Communication treatment
in the Magdalena region (1.53 vs. 1.57,
p 5 .90) and with this same treatment in the
Caribbean (0.67 vs. 0.63, p 5 .92).
We conclude, therefore, that the hypothesis
that informal communication and formal regulatory structures are complementary is not
supported generally. Of the six possible combinations of regions and regulations, we
observe three instances in which a regulation
combined with communication produced
more conservative harvests than communication alone, one case in which a regulation actually crowds out communication, and two cases
in which the combination of communication
and a regulation did not produce a significant
difference in harvests than communication
alone. Although there are likely to be regions
in which regulatory control of harvests from
a common pool resource complements informal community efforts, our results suggest
that such a relationship will not be robust
across communities and regulations.
13. In fact, the reduction in the Low Penalty/Communication treatment also exceeds that achieved by the Low
Penalty alone.

Our results beg the question of why different regions produce different results in the
same experiments, particularly considering
that the outcomes under Limited Access in
all three regions were identical. As noted earlier, with only three regions, it is not possible
to provide general explanations of how community characteristics affect behavior in our
experiments. Nevertheless, let us speculate
for a moment because an interesting mapping
may exist between the relative importance of
informal community efforts and government
regulations and our experimental results. Certainly, this relationship is worth exploring
with subsequent research.
Let us compare the Pacific and Magdalena
regions. The subject pools in these two regions
are very similar in terms of age, years of
formal education, gender composition, and
livelihood (Table 2). However, in the Pacific
region, the federal regulatory authority has
the strongest presence of the three regions
and the participants in the experiments generally agreed about the need for such regulations. In contrast, federal regulators have
little involvement in the Magdalena fishery;
instead, a local fishermen’s association plays
a significant role in the management of the
local fishery. Our results reveal that Communication alone was significantly more effective
in the Magdalena region than in the Pacific
region. Moreover, in the Magdalena region,
the Medium Penalty regulation did not complement Communication and the Low Penalty
regulation actually crowded out Communication. These results may be determined, at least
in part, by the fact that the government’s
impact on the fisheries of the Magdalena
region is low relative to local conservation
measures. On the other hand, in the Pacific
region, Communication alone was not very
effective at reducing harvests in our experiments and both the Low Penalty regulation
and the Medium Penalty regulation complemented Communication. It is possible that
this is explained partly by the strong presence
of the government in the fisheries on the
Pacific Coast. Our experiment results in these
two regions suggest the intriguing hypothesis
that the relative importance of government
regulations versus community conservation
efforts in specific communities may be positively correlated with whether regulations
complement group communication in experiments like ours.

The connection between the relative importance of regulations versus community efforts
and the results of our experiments is not as
clear in the Caribbean. In this region, there
are both minimal regulatory pressure and
the absence of clear community efforts to conserve the fishery. In addition, the subject pool
in the Caribbean was significantly different
from those in the Pacific and the Magdalena
regions. In particular, fewer of the subjects
earned their living primarily through fishing,
and fewer lived in the community for over
10 yr (Table 2). With a less stable population
that is less concentrated on fishing, it is possible that these subjects are less vested in
the local fishery. This combined with little formal or informal control of local harvests may
be the reasons for the weak mapping of the
context of the subjects’ lives into the experiment results.

IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The primary message of this work is a cautionary note concerning the performance of
government interventions in small-scale
resource industries in the developing world.
Although each of the regulatory interventions
we studied was effective at inducing more conservative harvests than under a limited-access
scenario, this comparison is not the most relevant one for evaluating government intervention in common pools in the developing world.
In most of these cases, regulatory interventions will be imposed on communities of
resource users that already have informal
norms about individual behavior in the commons albeit with widely varying degrees of
success. Thus, the relevant measure of the performance of a regulatory intervention is not
how it performs with respect to the theoretical
limited-access situation but how it performs
relative to existing informal conservation
efforts that stem from communication and
organization at the community level that
may or may not continue once a regulation
is in place. With regard to this comparison,
we observe that regulatory interventions
sometimes do more harm than good, are
sometimes completely ineffective, and at other
times enhance existing community efforts.
Since regulatory interventions are costly, they
are only warranted in those communities
where there is a strong likelihood that the

intervention complements existing community
efforts.
Identifying these communities calls for
more intense study of the determinants of
community responses to regulatory intervention. Geographical variation in the effectiveness of regulatory interventions could reflect
existing behavioral patterns under current
regulations, relationships with government
authorities, and patterns of cooperation among
community members to conserve a local
resource (Cardenas and Ostrom 2004; Henrich
et al. 2004). Clearly, further research is needed
to explore how community and individual
characteristics can explain variation in the responses to alternative institutions. Obviously,
this requires visiting many more communities
than we were able to. Yet, a clearer understanding of the relationships between community and
individual characteristics and behavior in common pool experiments would provide valuable
information about exploiting possible complementarities between community-based initiatives and external regulations and thus help in
the design of better policies to effectively and
efficiently reduce overexploitation of common
property resources in the developing world.
Finally, we think that our study highlights
and clarifies the value of conducting framed
field experiments. As we have stated several
times, our broader interest is in the performance of regulatory interventions in smallscale resource industries in the developing
world. Thus, rather than trying to address this
issue with students in university laboratories,
it is appropriate that we traveled to a developing country and conducted experiments that
presented a common pool dilemma to individuals whose livelihoods are tied to a common
pool resource. The advantage of such framed
field experiments is that subjects bring a context from their daily lives that could influence
their experiment behavior and that context is
an important element of the question that is
being addressed. The regional heterogeneity
of the responses to the institutions we examined in our experiments drives our main result
about the nonrobustness of a complementary
relationship between communication and
external regulations. If we had used university
students, we would have run the substantial
risk of missing the heterogeneity that is so
obviously important in the field.
However, the heterogeneity we observe not
only highlights the value of framed field

experiments but also implies that the field itself
is a heterogeneous, and often challenging,
place in a way that the laboratory is not.
Indeed, our results are a cautionary tale for
anyone who contemplates field experiments.
If we had attempted to draw conclusions
about the performance of regulatory institutions in small-scale fisheries in the developing
world from experiments conducted in only one
region of Colombia, the results would have
been just as misleading as the results from
the same experiments conducted in a laboratory with university students. Hence, the value
of fieldwork like ours does not come from simply designing framed experiments to examine
behavior by individuals who are intimately connected to the questions of interest, although in
cases like ours this is surely important. Replication in as many of the relevant settings as
possible is equally important.
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